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SUMMARY

This Independence Standard, as described in more detail herein:

A. Requires the audit firm, certain of its retirement plans, the audit
engagement team and those in a position to influence the audit, when
the firm is auditing mutual funds, to be independent of all sister
funds and all related non-fund entities. In addition, when auditing a
related non-fund entity, independence would be required by the same
entities and individuals of all funds in the mutual fund complex.
B. Permits:

i.

Direct investment in non-audit client sister funds by all other
partners and employees of the firm.

ii.

Spouses and dependents of partners, other than of the audit
engagement team and in a position to influence the audit, to
invest through an employee benefit plan in mutual funds that
are audit clients.

C. Is effective with respect to audits of financial statements for periods
beginning 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to
remove conflicts with the Standard. The SEC has proposed
rulemaking with regard to its independence rules, including
consideration of the provisions of this Standard. Notification of
relevant changes by the SEC will be posted to the ISB’s website at
www.cpaindependence.org when confirmation is received by the
Board.
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Independence Standards Board Standard No. 2
Certain Independence Implications of
Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities

INDEPENDENCE STANDARD
(Please note that terms appearing for the first
time in bold type are defined in paragraph 6.)

STANDARD

Applicability

1. This Standard applies to the determination of auditor independence with
respect to audits of mutual funds and related entities which are subject to the
independence requirements of the SEC.
Standard

2.
The auditing firm will not be considered independent of all of the entities
within the mutual fund complex if the partners in the firm, either individually
or collectively, have significant influence over any entity in that complex.
3.

In other situations:

a.
The auditing firm itself, and its retirement plans (other than self
directed defined contribution employee benefit plans, such as 401(k) plans),
and

b.
The audit engagement team and those in a position to influence
the audit, when the firm is auditing:

i.

A fund, must be independent of all sister funds.

ii. A related non-fund entity, must be independent of all related
non-client funds—that is, all funds in the complex.1
iii. One or more funds, must be independent of all related non-fund
entities in the mutual fund complex.2
1 If the related non-fund entity is an investment adviser, this would include all funds
it advises, even if they are outside this mutual fund complex.
2 If the fund’s investment adviser is outside the mutual fund complex, the independence
requirement still applies. That independence restriction further extends to any parent
company to which the investment advisory fees from the client funds are material, and
to all other subsidiaries of those covered parent companies.
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4.
A spouse, cohabitant or dependent of a partner not on the audit
engagement team, and not in a position to influence the audit, is permitted to
invest through an employer-sponsored benefit plan in mutual funds that are
audit clients of the firm.
Effective Date

5.
The above requirements are effective with respect to audits of financial
statements for periods beginning 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are
modified to remove conflicts with the Standard. The SEC has proposed
rulemaking with regard to its independence rules, including consideration of
the provisions of this Standard. Notification of relevant changes by the SEC
will be posted to the ISB’s website at www.cpaindependence.org when
confirmation is received by the Board.

Definitions

6.

Terms and phrases noted in bold in the Standard are defined below:
a. Investment adviser. Manages the mutual fund’s portfolio according
to the objectives and policies described in the fund’s prospectus,
executes its portfolio transactions, and typically serves as distributor of
its shares to investors. When a “sub-adviser” substantively acts in the
overall management role of an investment adviser with respect to a fund,
it is to be considered the same as an investment adviser. (A sub-adviser
is an entity generally identified, subcontracted and overseen by the
investment adviser for a portfolio management role.)

b. Mutual funds. Investment companies subject to the Investment
Company Act of 1940. These include, for example, open-end and closedend funds, and unit investment trusts.
c. Mutual fund complex. The mutual fund operation in its entirety,
including all the funds, plus the sponsor, its ultimate parent company,
and their subsidiaries.
d. Non-fund entity. For example, the investment adviser, a broker
dealer, a bank, or an insurance company in the mutual fund complex.

e. Sister funds. Mutual funds in a complex with a common investment
adviser.
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f. Those in a position to influence the audit. Those in a position to
influence the audit are those who supervise or have direct management
responsibility for, (including at all successively senior levels, up through
the firm’s chief executive), or provide technical consultation, quality
control or other oversight of, the partners and staff members involved in
the audit. (In determining whether an individual meets one of these
criteria, firms must be sensitive to their immediate practice environment.
For example, in a small office, practice unit or firm, all partners might be
considered as in a position to influence the audit, even if in an informal
manner.)
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BACKGROUND
7.
At its March 12, 1999 meeting, the Board agreed that certain mutual
fund issues should be added to its project agenda, and that the project should
be expedited by moving directly to an Exposure Draft (ED). The project had
been recommended in a letter from the Chief Accountant of the SEC and also
requested through practice experience. A Board oversight task force was
appointed to provide guidance for the project, and a broad-based project task
force reviewed the documents for completeness and clarity.

8.
In September 1999 the ISB issued ED 99-1, Certain Independence
Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities. The ED proposed
rules similar to those in this final Standard, except that it also would have
required independence of partners (and, in certain cases, those defined as
“managerial employees”) in an office participating in a significant portion of the
audit engagement.

9.
The Board received twelve letters in response to the ED, all of which were
generally supportive, and many had specific suggestions for changes. After
deliberation, the Board agreed with certain of those recommendations, as
described in the “Basis for Conclusions.”
10. In June 2000 the Board determined to modify the effective date of this
Standard as described in paragraph 5. An exposure draft proposing this
change was issued and seventeen comment letters were received, virtually all of
which supported this amendment.

11. The Board’s general rules (the published SEC rules adopted at the
commencement of the Board) require an audit firm, and its “members” (as
defined), to be independent of its audit clients. This general independence
requirement is not changed by ISB Standard No. 2, except as to paragraph 4.
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BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS
Introduction

12. The Board’s desire is to provide guidance in mutual fund auditor
independence issues to help ensure, in a rapidly changing environment, the
continued integrity of audited financial statements for the ultimate benefit of
investors and other users of these statements.
13. It is believed the Standard will also significantly reduce a perceived lack of
clarity in present guidance, and thereby reduce likely diversity in practice.

14. To accomplish its goal, the ISB weighed a variety of significant factors,
some of which are described below, in reaching its determination of an
appropriate Standard.
Attributes of the Mutual Fund Organizational Structure

15. The organizational structure of a mutual funds complex (See Appendices A
and B) varies significantly from that of a typical corporation, and the Board
believes these differences are relevant to the setting of auditor independence
standards. Specifically, SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (b) states that auditor
independence is required as to the client and “...any of its parents, its
subsidiaries, or other affiliates...,” but the typical mutual fund/adviser
relationship is not that of a subsidiary/parent. Among the principal differences
are that:

a.
In an investment adviser/mutual fund relationship, there is no
majority ownership or voting control, as is present in a parent of a
subsidiary; and

b.
Unlike the case of a subsidiary, the investment income of a mutual
fund, after the deduction of adviser management fees, distribution fees,
and other fund expenses, is distributed to the fund shareholders as
opposed to the related investment adviser.
On the other hand, while not having voting control of a fund, the investment
adviser usually provides the fund’s officers and performs substantially all
services required in its operations, and thus plays an important, even
controlling, role in its policies and operations.

Analysis of Common Service Providers
16. Mutual funds often use common service providers to centralize services
and control costs, and the Board believes such common services are relevant to
the related independence issues. In analyzing the key factors and threats
relevant to the sister fund issue, the Board concluded that the use among funds
of a common investment adviser was an important enough link to provide the
basis for the independence restriction. In response to comments received on
the ED, the circumstances under which “sub-advisers” also would be restricted
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were clarified to cover only those situations in which the sub-adviser
substantively acts in the overall management role of an investment adviser,
because it is in that role, rather than as a portfolio manager, that any potential
threat to independence exists.

17. The Board also considered the providers of other common services,
including fund boards of directors and accounting systems, but concluded they
were less relevant than a common investment adviser and that the
independence restriction should be based solely on the presence of common
investment advisers.
Difference between Defined Benefit and
Defined Contribution Plan Investments

18. The Board distinguished between the firm-directed investments of firm
defined benefit plans and the self-directed investment choices available in
certain firm defined contribution plans (such as 401(k) plans), and concluded
that the risks differed sufficiently to provide a lesser restriction for certain
personnel in the defined contribution plans. That is, the direct beneficiary of
investment performance in a defined benefit plan is the firm sponsor, since the
level of further firm contributions will be affected by the investment
performance. By contrast, the direct beneficiary of investment performance in a
defined contribution plan is the employee. As a result, the Board concluded
that the firm’s defined benefit plans should not be able to invest in non-audit
client sister funds, but that the firm could offer a sister fund investment
alternative in its defined contribution plans to non-involved partners and staff
without impairing its independence.
Partner Spousal Employee Benefit Plan Investments

19. The Board recognizes that permitting investments through employersponsored benefit plans by partners’ spouses in mutual funds that are audit
clients is not consistent with the present rules. However, the Board also
believes this change to be warranted as a practical good in this changing social
environment, because the risk that such investments will adversely affect audit
quality appears trivial. A number of factors were considered in reaching this
conclusion, including the following:
a.

Many more spouses are working today;

b.

Benefit plans (especially 401(k)s) have become much more common;

c.
Audits of mutual funds in those plans have become more
concentrated within a few large firms due to consolidation of both financial
institutions and auditors;

d.
A number of plans provide only one family of mutual fund
investments. Under existing rules, if the funds are audit clients of a firm,
the spouses and dependents of all partners in the firm would be prohibited
from participating in the plans. As a result, the person would lose tax
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deferral benefits and employer matching contributions, and sometimes
have to forfeit accumulated benefits; and
e.
It is highly unlikely that those who are exempted could influence the
audit.

This decision will be reconsidered when the Board addresses the question of
investment in audit clients comprehensively.

Firm Significant Influence Over an Entity
in the Mutual Fund Complex
20. Paragraph 2 restricts a firm when its partners collectively have significant
influence over an entity in the mutual fund complex. The intent in making
such a determination is to address situations where partners are “acting
together” in this investment. On the other hand, later knowledge that
numerous partners, not having knowledge of one another’s common
investments, could have had “significant influence” over the entity if they acted
together would not indicate that “significant influence” had existed at the earlier
date.

Those in a Position to Influence the Audit
21. Paragraph 3 restricts firm partners and employees who are on the audit
engagement team and those in a position to influence the audit. (The phrase
“those in a position to influence the audit” was substituted for “chain of
command,” in response to comments received on the ED because it is more
descriptive of the individuals included.) The definition of the phrase “those in a
position to influence the audit” in paragraph 6 (f) describes two groups of
individuals who may have such influence: those with direct management
responsibility, and those who provide technical or related consultation. It is
intended that the individuals with direct management responsibility for the
audit and for related accounting, auditing and similar consultation services be
subject to the restrictions of this Standard, whether or not they participate in
any way in the audit. On the other hand, professionals in a consulting
department, other than the person in charge, may be “recused” and therefore
made not subject to the Standard’s restrictions, if they in fact are not, and will
not be, involved in any way in the audit.

Uninvolved Partners and Managerial Employees

22. Several respondents to the ED suggested that it was unnecessary to
include all partners and managerial employees working in the office conducting
the audit in the category of those in a position to influence the audit. After
deliberation, the Board agreed that there was at most a remote threat to
independence from such individuals, if they were otherwise uninvolved in the
audit. Consequently, the final Standard does not restrict those persons from
investing in sister mutual funds, or their immediate family members from
investing in client mutual funds through an employer defined contribution
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plan. Existing independence rules, however, prohibit their direct investment in
client funds.

Analysis of Other Bases for Evaluating Independence Restrictions
23. In addition to considering the commonality of service providers for sister
funds as described above, the Board also considered other and broader
alternative bases for evaluating auditor independence in the mutual fund
environment. For example, various applications of materiality tests were
considered, as was the application of independence restrictions on a case-bycase basis to counter specific threats. The Board concluded that its Standard
better fulfills its needs, in part because it provides a simpler but effective
approach to addressing the independence threats raised.

Risks/Threats and Safeguards Analysis
24. In view of the importance of a risks/threats analysis and the need for
related safeguards, the Board considered extensively the potential for particular
independence concerns. This included those threats possible if an auditor were
to encounter a systemic problem during the course of auditing one fund that
would adversely impact another non-client fund in the complex, shares of
which are owned by other individuals in the auditor’s firm. (A safeguard to
mitigate this potential threat is the fact that the non-client fund would be
audited by a different firm.) The general concerns—the possible loss of
objectivity in the audit and the need for independence in both fact and
appearance—also were discussed. The Board’s determination was that while
some threats could be envisioned specific to mutual fund-related situations,
any remaining threats to the auditor’s independence, after considering existing
controls and the application of this Standard, were insignificant.

Deferral of Effective Date
25. ISB Standard No. 2 is an integrated set of provisions which the Board
believes is appropriately restrictive to protect the public interest and be
responsive to the threats envisioned, while not imposing restrictions on those
other individuals where the Board believed the risks to be minimal. The
Standard developed under this new approach included provisions both more
and less restrictive than current SEC rules, principally because of its “on the
engagement” focus and spousal benefit plan exemption.
26. The Board initially decided, when ISB No. 2 was issued in December,
1999, that the more restrictive provisions of the document should go into effect
on the then-scheduled effective date of June 15, 2000, regardless of whether or
not the SEC had amended its more restrictive rules by that time. The “effective
date” language in the original Standard read as follows:

The above requirements are effective with respect to audits of
financial statements for periods beginning after June 15, 2000, with
earlier application encouraged. However, in certain respects, current
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rules of the SEC and, as to spousal employee benefit plan interests, of
the AICPA, are more restrictive than the provisions of this Standard.
Compliance with those existing more restrictive rules continues to be
necessary unless and until both the SEC and the AICPA revise those
rules. Notification that these changes have been made will be posted
to the ISB’s website at www.cpaindependence.org when confirmation
is received by the Board. Where provisions of this Standard are more
restrictive, those provisions are to be complied with as of the above
effective date.
27. Subsequently, questions were raised as to the appropriateness of a
partially effective Independence Standard, on the basis that it would add
unnecessarily to the existing complexity of regulations.
28. Based upon its consideration of various factors, the Board determined that
a deferral of the original June 15, 2000 effective date of ISB Standard No. 2
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts
with the Standard is in the best interests of its constituents and therefore
appropriate.

29. In reaching this decision, the Board acknowledges the statutory oversight
responsibility of the SEC for the activities of the Board. In light of that, it
concluded that it would not be desirable to impose a set of new independence
restrictions while existing rules remain in effect until the SEC endorsed (or
indicated it did not object to) such new rules by modifying its existing ones.
30. In May 2000 the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee adopted
the following policy statement:
As to any pronouncement passed by the Independence Standards Board
(ISB), the Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) will treat such a
pronouncement as authoritative for any engagement requiring
independence unless and until the PEEC announces that it will not view
that pronouncement as authoritative. Accordingly, in situations where an
AICPA standard is more restrictive, in total or in part, than an ISB
pronouncement, the PEEC will not consider a member’s independence to
be impaired as a result of their non-compliance with respect to a more
restrictive AICPA standard until members are given notice of the PEEC’s
rejection of the ISB’s less restrictive pronouncement.

Consequently, the language regarding the AICPA’s rules has been deleted from
the effective date paragraph.
Summary

31.

Based upon:
a.
Its consideration of the unique organizational structure of mutual
fund entities;
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b.
The differences inherent in self-directed defined contribution
employee benefit plans;
c.
The lack of apparent significant independence risk from mutual fund
audits; and

d.
The very limited threats to auditor independence from participation in
an employer-sponsored benefit plan by spouses and dependents of those
neither on the audit engagement team nor in a position to influence the
audit,
the Board believes its Standard is appropriately restrictive to protect the public
interest and be responsive to those threats that were envisioned, while not
imposing restrictions on those other individuals and plans where the Board
believes the risks are minimal.

32. The Board recognizes that every additional requirement imposes costs,
but the Board believes that the costs to implement this pronouncement will be
small when compared with the benefits.
33. This Standard and its amendment were both adopted unanimously by the
the Board.

Members of the Independence Standards Board
William T. Allen, Chair
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Stephen G. Butler
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Philip A. Laskawy
Barry C. Melancon
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1. Makes presentations for the board, and prepares SEC, tax and shareholder reports.
2. Maintains fund's accounting records, computes net asset value (NAV) daily and forwards
NAV to transfer agent, and prepares the fund's financial statements.
3. Maintains shareholder accounting records and issues share certificates.
4. Conceives the fund and markets it to investors.
5. Manages the fund and executes its portfolio transactions. Also provides portfolio
management services and overall executive management of the fund, including (in
consultation with the board) selection of other service providers.
6. Responds to shareholders' inquiries by accessing records maintained by Transfer Agent.
7. Audits the fund's financial statements.
8. Provides legal services.
9. Holds securities in safekeeping; receives and delivers securities as instructed. Except for
the auditor, the only entity servicing the fund which (absent meeting certain incremental
criteria) must be independent of the fund complex.
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